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Reviewed by Kenneth Anderson*
The eminent legal historian Mary L. Dudziak has written a book on the
meaning of time in war. The separation of the words as found in the title,
War and Time, appears to be deliberate.1 Dudziak’s essay proposes to isolate
and identify the effects of time as it passes during war—particularly when it
is a long and indefinite time—upon a society and ultimately upon a culture.
Time in the course of war is, in this telling, both jaws and tail of the dragon.
It is both cause and effect, within and upon culture and society.2
This plays out in a special way for Americans, however. The American
cultural conception of “time” in “war” seeks to confine war to a presumably
temporary emergency.3 Policies that would otherwise be legally, politically,
socially, and culturally unacceptable—encroachments upon civil rights and
liberties, most prominently, but also encroachments upon property rights, and
regulatory changes of many kinds from taxation to price controls—become
accepted as legitimate, extraordinary measures “for the duration.” An
uncertain duration, perhaps, but a duration nonetheless assumed in a
culturally deep way to be temporary.4 The legitimacy of these war measures
is accepted not just because they are claimed to be “necessary” in exceptional
circumstances. They are also accepted because—independently—American
cultural assumptions about the nature of war define them as not merely

* Kenneth Anderson is Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University;
Visiting Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University and member of its Task Force on
National Security and Law; and nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. His most
recent book, Living with the UN: American Responsibilities and International Order, was released
by Hoover Institution Press in 2012.
1. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 3 (2012)
(contrasting wartime as battletime with war “break[ing] time into pieces).
2. See id. at 3–4 (characterizing wartime as “moving and changing society” and as resulting
from “the way we think about war”).
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 3–5.
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necessary exceptions, but as temporally confined. 5 War in the American
historical imagination is temporary.6
Necessity in war, then, is the hard master pressing exceptional measures
upon society.7 Time, and the assumed temporary nature of war as a state of
exception, however, soothes their acceptance and helps establish their
legitimacy by contrasting them with “normal” times.8 Peace is defined as
normality; it is defined as “normal” time.9 And yet the rub: the passage of
time in war, when it goes on and on (and particularly when it goes on without
discernible end or even a way to define an end) tends to harden effects that
were supposed to be temporary, confined to the emergency of war, into
permanent changes in society and culture.10 Time in war—the passage of
time in war—is an independent social cause with its own social and cultural
effects. We should therefore not be comforted quite so much as Americans
are by the culturally reinforced belief that war, or at any rate, war’s effects
upon the ordinary life of peacetime, is temporary.
In war, Dudziak writes, “regular time” is thought to be “interrupted, and
time is out of order.” 11 The distinction between time “out of order,”
established by the social condition of war, and regular time, leads to the
category of “wartime,” which functions as both a passive historical descriptor
and a causal cultural actor.12 If the book’s title initially deliberately separates
the two categories, this is in order to see that their subsequent combination in
the text signals a distinct social category of its own, one that is established by
the fact of war and the social perception of time, and which has independent
effects upon society. At the large historical level, Dudziak notes, war slices
“human experience into eras, creating a before and an after”—for example,
antebellum and postbellum Civil War America, or the “postwar” after World
War II. 13 Yet beyond merely being a way of descriptively periodizing
history—a series of convenient before and after signposts—wartime also
functions as an “abstract historical actor, moving and changing society and
creating particular conditions of governance.”14
War Time is a fine and excellent book, an ambitious exercise in the
genres of cultural critique and the history of ideas. The genre of cultural
criticism is often characterized by the use of cultural materials that range
across literature and the arts, high and pop culture, tropes of culture offered
and interpreted to reveal some deeper perception of culture and society.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 4–5.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Dudziak is a distinguished legal historian, however, and what she brings
specially to this enterprise are both the raw materials of law in time of war
and peace and the analytic toolkit of legal academics. The profound
contribution of War Time to the understanding of society and culture draws
upon Dudziak’s ability to bridge from the usual materials of cultural criticism
and law and legal analysis, melding them into an analytic whole.
The reference to “governance” is fundamental. War Time seeks in part
to deploy its two terms as abstract analytic categories for interpreting culture
and in part to deploy a variety of cultural materials in interpreting those two
terms. In that sense it is as much intellectual history as it is cultural criticism.
Mostly, however, it seeks to apply those categories to America’s experiences
following 9/11: the decade of the war on terror. 15 The “governance” to
which the book’s introduction refers, in other words, is the governance of
America today, in the time of the war on terror. Dudziak’s aim is to
illuminate the meaning and effect of wartime in the almost twelve years since
9/11. 16 The attacks by al-Qaeda on 9/11 created wartime for the United
States as a social fact, but also as a contested legal categorization.17 That fact
had profound effects on governance.18 The processes of governance in turn
created new effects—triggering, for example, the independent powers of the
Commander in Chief and precipitating the authorization of war by Congress
and thus the legal ordering of “time out of order” 19 —which is to say,
triggering the legal predicates for “wartime.”20
Commentators across every intellectual discipline have sought since
2001 to illuminate precisely these questions regarding the war on terror and
governance, of course. The arguments start with the question of whether it
illuminates, obscures, or elides even to refer to the governance of the last
eleven years as a “war” at all, let alone a “war on terror.”21 How to characterize the nature of the conflict, the enemy, and America’s responses?
These unsettled, still-bitter arguments illustrate a point often made by law
professors to first-year law students, viz., how a question is framed will
largely structure available responses. Were the 9/11 attacks acts of war, of
criminality, or both?22 What fundamental bodies of law apply to what parts
15. See id. at 7–9 (explaining that the book focuses on the American conception of wartime due
to the central role played by the United States in twenty-first-century conflict in the context of the
war on terror).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 103–05, 112–13.
18. See id. at 103–05 (describing the expanded executive powers that came with defining the
post-9/11 era as an era of war).
19. Id. at 3, 103–05.
20. See id. (describing efforts to characterize the attacks of 9/11 as an act of war and the
necessary response as one of wartime and war powers).
21. See id. at 112–14 (describing different approaches to defining the post-9/11 era in legal
terms).
22. See John Yoo, Ten Years Without an Attack, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424053111904332804576538443334834166.html (“Looking back over the
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of the “war” on terror? Where do these bodies of law apply—and where not?
These debates have never stopped since 2001 and will not, since many of
those arguing do not agree on first framing principles. The principal policies
and laws at issue have varied since 9/11. Detention, interrogation, rendition,
and Guantanamo dominated in the early years. Targeted killing and drone
warfare increasingly dominate today.23 But the framing categories remain as
essential as ever.
More than ten years after 9/11, however, the core issue has gradually
shifted from this framing category or that, or this particular policy or that, to
a much more fundamental question. Whatever exactly the framing categories
are, or whatever key national security policies in this “wartime” might be
(keep Guantanamo open or close it, conduct military commissions or civilian
trials, etc.), the deeper issue is this: Is the United States, as a society and
government, finding “institutional settlement” for post-9/11 national security
and law? Is it finding institutional stability of general principles, national
security policies that are stable and accepted as broadly legitimate within
American society over time, relatively independent and irrespective of
particular, changing, and contingent political actors? Is the United States
gradually achieving “institutional settlement” that will be stable across
changes of presidential administration and political party, changes of party
control of Congress, and changes in the composition of the federal courts,
with regard to how the United States acts against transnational terrorism and
terrorists, in fulfilling a broad public mandate (in language of the AUMF) to
“prevent future acts of international terrorism”24 against America?
* * *
Institutional settlement is a category dependent upon time—stability of
law, policy, and social and political legitimacy across time. Moreover, as
War Time teaches us, the experience of the years since 9/11 reflects that the
“time” built into institutional settlement is socially, legally, and politically
conditioned. 25 Stability is partly a temporal concept, and institutions
likewise. The “time” that establishes settlement has to be able to cross the
boundaries of party and faction, and reflect internalized acceptance
constituting legitimacy among a wide swath of America. Legitimacy is one

decade, the first clear lesson is the critical importance of Mr. Bush’s decision to consider the
struggle with al Qaeda a war.”); see also DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 113–14 (discussing the debate
over whether the “war on terror” was a “war,” “emergency,” “crisis,” or something that fit no
existing definition).
23. See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, Targeted Killings from Many Perspectives, 91 TEXAS L.
REV. 925 (2013) (reviewing TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL
WORLD (Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012) and discussing the legal issues surrounding targeted
killings in the war on terror).
24. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11 Terrorists, 50 U.S.C. § 1541
(2006).
25. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the importance of wartime and peacetime in
international law); id. at 17–19 (discussing social, cultural, and economic influences on the
definition of time).
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of the mechanisms by which governance brings time out of the disorder of
wartime and back into longer run conceptions of order—temporally situating
it in relation to the legitimacy of the political community over the long run,
in peacetime and wartime. After two Bush Administrations, one Obama
Administration and the start of another, institutional settlement in national
security policy surrounding transnational terrorism carried out by nonstate
actors is the fundamental issue. What makes it necessarily—not exclusively
by any means, but certainly necessarily—intertwined with time as a social
and cultural category is that time is conceptually part of stability and
settlement.
Yet much of the analytic framing of the proper response to 9/11 has
focused less on time than on who, as manifest in categories of legal definition
with profound legal consequences: terrorist, enemy combatant, unprivileged
belligerent, alien, citizen, and so on.26 Much of the analytic framing of the
proper response to 9/11, too, has focused on place and space: what is the
“legal geography” of war, the geographic reach of the law of war,
governance under a legal framing of “war,” the question of where war and its
law governs and where it does not.27 Law defined by “person” and “place”
has in turn largely framed the received understanding of wartime in the war
on terror. If, for example, one is picked up as an unprivileged belligerent and
terrorist actor and alien in a certain place (for example, outside of United
States territory), then the temporal consequences include the possibility of
detention until the end of the conflict, whatever and however long that might
mean—including forever.
War Time adds something distinctive to the analysis of these categories.
Dudziak addresses time as its own category, and not merely as a set of
temporal consequences of other framing governance and legal categories
such as person and place (such as how long might a person be detained at
Guantanamo).28 This book teaches us that “time” in war has its own etiology
and its own effects.29 War Time seeks to give an account of time’s etiology
and effects, and specifically its effects upon governance, in the war on

26. See id. at 121–22 (describing how the Supreme Court considered the defendant’s enemy
combatant status and citizenship in determining due process rights in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)); id. at 101 (quoting President Bush’s
characterization of the war on terror as “a new kind of war” that required a new kind of response
based on the identity of the combatants).
27. See id. at 123 (explaining that geography was the “[m]ost important” consideration in
determining whether the right of habeas corpus applied outside U.S. borders). For discussion of this
perhaps obscure term, see Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came
to Debate Whether There Is a “Legal Geography of War,” in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL
SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/documents/FutureChallenges_Anderson.pdf.
28. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 23 (labeling wartime as a “central category” in law and
politics).
29. See id. at 23–26 (explaining that war time has “force in history, enhancing the power of
government” and that this may sometimes restrain civil liberties).
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terror.30 This insight drives the attention the book merits from both legal
scholars and readers across the fields of the humanities. War Time draws
valuable attention to a category that is undertheorized in legal scholarship,
and—specifically in the field of national security law and policy—it draws
attention to the independent weight of time, as more than merely a collateral
effect of other categories such as person and place. If the two rhetorical
categories are necessity in war, on the one hand, and time in war, on the
other, then nearly all of the arguments over today’s national security policies
have run to necessity. Dudziak forces us to take account of the other, time
and the independent significance of its passage.
The book is organized in a straightforward fashion. First, War Time
offers a general framing of time and war as cultural categories.31 Most of
this draws upon traditional methods of cultural criticism, though parts of it
reach to specifically legal materials. The book then turns to examine
wartime as it was understood in two distinct, and distinctly different, wars—
World War II and the Cold War. 32 These are compared and contrasted
against each other with respect to the cultural perception of their boundaries,
beginnings and endings, and the fixedness and permeability of those
temporal markers.
Finally, Dudziak turns to 9/11 and its aftermath, applying insights
drawn about time and war from these earlier wars to the war on terror.33 The
burden of her observations across all these wars is one of law and policy: she
is always looking, in her choice of cultural tropes and objects of cultural
analysis, toward their implications for the war on terror.34 She aims to show,
at bottom, that by comparison to past “wars”—both “real” wars, such as
WWII, and the conceptually looser and somewhat metaphorical Cold War—
the temporal framing of the war on terror is a legal and policy mistake.35 It
justifies legal and policy measures across time that are driven in part by a
conceptual framing based on war, justifying “emergency” temporary

30. Id. at 3–4, 7.
31. Id. at 17, 21–26.
32. Id. at 47–48, 61–62 (discussing World War II); id. at 68–69, 91–92 (discussing the Cold
War).
33. See id. at 101–02 (comparing President Bush’s response to 9/11 to the responses in World
War II and the Cold War); id. at 115–16 (describing attempts to define “wartime” in the context of
World War II and the Cold War); id. at 123 (comparing the legality of wartime detention post-9/11
to that during World War II).
34. See id. at 120–22 (describing the Supreme Court’s attempt at framing the post-9/11 world
within the traditional paradigm offered by earlier wars); id. at 126–27 (noting that the post-9/11
Supreme Court took a deferential approach to national security questions much like it did during the
Cold War).
35. See id. at 6–7 (asserting that the “narrative cohesion” of the understanding of wartime that
was used in World War II and the Cold War does not apply to the war on terror in framing current
law and politics issues).
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measures36 for a “conflict,” however, that lacks temporal specificity even in
principle.37
Thus, the book argues by its conclusion, the war on terror, as law and
policy, assumes without adequate justification notions of temporary measures
that are not in fact so, and more than a decade onward after 9/11, quite
evidently not so.38 These temporary measures are what they have been in
war after war in American history: restrictions on civil rights and liberties.
They result in considerable part, War Time urges, from American cultural
assumptions about war.39 And, in turn, these cultural assumptions about war
make (and depend upon) further cultural assumptions about time, and the
meaning of time in war. But these assumptions are assumed largely without
political or legal debate, no matter how much argument there is about
specific emergency measures, simply because they are baked into our
cultural concepts. As substratum assumptions shared by both American right
and left in political and legal battles over national security policy, Dudziak
argues by the book’s final chapters, they tacitly structure important terms of
the argument, and lead to wrong, or at least unnecessary, policies and laws.
To a considerable extent, they are less policies or laws than artifacts of our
cultural constructs. Americans “disagreed deeply about this war,” Dudziak
says in her conclusion, but “coalesced around the idea that the times were not
normal times.”40 If that is so, then the task of cultural criticism is to strip
away the veil of “necessity” covering these measures that are, so to speak,
soothed into acceptance by an underlying assumption that, it being wartime,
these are “temporary” measures. This is the independent importance of time
as a social and cultural category. A cultural framing of wartimes as “discrete
and temporary occasions, destined to give way to a state of normality,
undermines democratic vigilance.”41
This means, however, that War Time has a prescriptive character by its
end, one that reaches to policy and law in America today. It seeks to draw
out of its readings and decodings of cultural and historical materials an
argument that is, in its largest reach, an argument from false consciousness.
The essential prescription of War Time is a call to see whether, if false
consciousness is stripped away—once “we understand that political actors
help to generate a shared political time”—then are we freed to “see that we
are not driven by our times, but instead shape them.” 42 And the book’s
prescriptive call is to tell us that we need not “suspend our principles”—
36. See id. at 4 (explaining that exceptional wartime policies are justified by the assumption
embedded in American legal and political thought that war is temporary).
37. See id. at 135 (explaining that the war on terror establishes a wartime with no boundaries
and may be a perpetual war).
38. Id. at 135–36.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 135.
41. Id. at 136.
42. Id.
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meaning our principles of civil rights and liberties, particularly—and that the
stance ought to be resistance to incursions upon them predicated on the
necessities of wartime.43
* * *
This prescription involves large claims, both methodological and
normative, and it is an equally large question whether they are justified.
Have we actually “suspended our principles” or are they simply more
capacious than Dudziak believes? Is national security governance today,
nearly a dozen years post-9/11, actually driven by some logic of pure, even
perhaps Schmittian, necessity?44 Or have today’s national security responses
long since moved beyond “necessitarian” logic, and are they simply part of a
normal and ordinary movement back and forth within the eternal tradeoff
between liberty and security, both of which are highly regarded values of
American democracy?
And, finally, how would one answer those skeptical questions? Is the
method of War Time—its admittedly intriguing mix of cultural critique and
the history of ideas in culture and society—able to answer these deeply
policy and political questions? The traditional skeptical response to a
traditional argument from false consciousness, after all, is to ask on what
criteria we should conclude that one’s—or, at the society-wide level of
something broadly accepted and taken as legitimate, everyone’s—
consciousness is “false.”45 How are we supposed to know?
The methods of cultural criticism—the methods, for that matter, of
criticism as a genre generally—depend upon assessments, readings, and
interpretations of varied cultural materials from which one extracts insights
into a larger phenomenon.46 At the end of this Review, we will look at them
from the outside, so to speak, of cultural criticism, and ask whether and to
what extent their use is appropriate to the ultimately prescriptive policy
agenda of War Time. We start in a different way, however—by accepting the
methods of cultural critique used in the book and asking to what extent they
seem persuasive on their own terms.
This is not, of course, something for which certainty can be offered.
There is no QED, because whether one accepts either the relevance, or
degree of relevance, of some cultural trope or practice as being able to
illuminate a larger cultural or social order is inherently subjective. It depends
heavily on inviting the audience to read both critically and sympathetically,
with a certain amount of reasoning but a large amount of invitation to “see”
that this phenomenon and the interpolation of it is revelatory in some fashion.

43. Id.
44. See id. at 115–17 (discussing German political theorist Carl Schmitt).
45. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography,
79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1140 (1993) (criticizing antipornography arguments based on false
consciousness on the grounds of making presumptions about what is in women’s best interests).
46. ARTHUR ASA BERGER, CULTURAL CRITICISM: A PRIMER OF KEY CONCEPTS 2–3 (1995).
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It is the elaboration of insight rather than derivation, and depends upon
apperception far more than deduction. This is not necessarily a familiar or
congenial method for many in the legal academy who might encounter this
book, as historian Samuel Moyn observed in his own Lawfare review of War
Time.47 The book, he correctly notes, devotes many pages to the “task of
connecting students of the law and students of the humanities, who rarely
share one another’s assumptions. Humanists will regard much of Dudziak’s
text as an anecdotally rich and sprightly written reestablishment of the
threshold claim that culture and society affect temporal categories and
experience.”48
Intellectually important parts of the legal academy today, however,
aspire in large part to social science as Ur-discipline and the methodological
starting point for legal scholarship, not to the humanities (and perhaps least
of all to the areas of the humanities that produce cultural criticism). The
method might therefore be somewhat alien, perhaps off-putting, to some
legal academics. Let’s set that external concern aside for now, and take the
method on its own terms. How persuasive is Dudziak in her basic claims that
WWII is the essence of a discretely bounded war in American imagination,
with Pearl Harbor on the one end and VJ Day on the other (but not actually
so, if one looks to its history); that the Cold War perturbed but did not
ultimately supplant the American sense of war as discretely bounded, but
instead seemingly took advantage of that bounded sense to establish
temporally unbounded national security structures; and that the war on terror,
whatever label is currently put on it, fundamentally misframes “it” as a
matter of “temporary” time and temporality?49
Dudziak’s account of time and WWII acknowledges that Pearl Harbor
looks to be a very concrete beginning and Japan’s final surrender in 1945 a
very concrete end. 50 It is embedded that way in American historical
imagination, and, she says, it is the modern experience that establishes the
American sense of war as a state of exception, with measures of emergency
justified in part by a belief that they will be temporary because war is
essentially temporary. She says:
The effort to contain World War II within the Pearl Harbor-tosurrender frame reinforces traditional ideas about wartime. This
matters because wartime is the occasion for the use of the federal
government’s war powers. The assumption that wars are finite

47. Samuel Moyn, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences, LAWFARE (May 24,
2012,
11:10
AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/war-time-an-idea-its-history-itsconsequences/. Full disclosure: I serve as the Book Review Editor for Lawfare and commissioned
Moyn’s review.
48. Id.
49. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 35–36, 68–72.
50. Id. at 35–36.
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legitimizes the exercise of war powers by making it seem that their use
is temporary.51
One might think that the book’s comparison to the Cold War is made in
order to suggest that this deeply reinforced cultural assumption by Americans
over generations exposes a mismatch between the finite temporal
expectations inherited from WWII and the facts of a Cold War of deeply
uncertain duration. In part, Dudziak means just that, temporal mismatch—
though she also devotes many pages to showing that WWII was far less
bounded than the American imagination suggests.52 Her evidence for this
latter proposition is interesting because it raises questions about the
methodology at issue here. She walks through a considerable body of
material showing that, in fact, the boundaries between war and “not war” are
porous, and that Roosevelt had gone most of that distance before Pearl
Harbor—so much so that many senior advisors were privately relieved that
the Japanese attack took the burden off of uniting the country around a much
more diffuse and gradual involvement in the conflict. 53 As a matter of
concrete history, this is quite correct and not disputed.
But particularly for evidence of the porousness of WWII at its close, she
draws on materials that draw upon both cultural critique and law. She
examines in detail the capital murder trial of John Lee, an inmate in the
United States Army Disciplinary Barracks in 1949, accused of killing another
inmate;54 the key legal question was whether the court-martial was lawful
under a (pre-Uniform Code of Military Justice) statute providing that no
person could be tried for “murder or rape committed” within the territorial
United States “in time of peace.” 55 Was it “wartime or peacetime”? 56
Dudziak’s discussion is fascinating as regards this case and all its precedents
stretching back to the U.S. Army’s pursuit of Pancho Villa in Mexico.57 The
resolution involves the Supreme Court saying that there can be “war” for
some purposes and “peace” for others; John Lee was released on those
grounds. 58 One effect is to reinforce Dudziak’s observation that even in
WWII, the boundary between war and peace was more porous than simply
the act of surrender and the formal cessation of hostilities.59
But even operating from within a method of cultural critique, I am not
so persuaded that these legal cases offer much in the way of evidence about

51. Id. at 36.
52. Id. at 36–52.
53. Id. at 48–49.
54. Id. at 33–40.
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 36–40.
58. See id. at 39 (contending that Justice Douglas used “common sense” to distinguish Lee’s
capital case, held to occur during peacetime, from contemporaneous rent-control regulations, held to
be during wartime).
59. Id. at 40.
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how the boundaries of war and peace were perceived. Dudziak’s more
fundamental point—that the perception of a sharply bounded WWII
influenced the assumptions framing the Cold War—seems to me more
correct. The cases and their legal rules concerning the end of conflict have
the air not of deep principles, but merely of the far more routine task of
courts giving answers to questions where the answers might just as easily
have gone the other way, without very much effect into the future or much
root in the past, in large part because it is understood that the decisions are
necessarily arbitrary to some degree. This shows something of the
subjectivity of materials and conclusions in this kind of cultural
interpretation and how reasonable minds, even situating themselves within
Dudziak’s method, could quite easily disagree as to interpretation and
significance.
The same skepticism could be brought to bear, even within the methods
of cultural criticism and intellectual history, against another set of cultural
artifacts about time and war in the book—the issuance of U.S. military
campaign service medals. The text (and full appendix) makes surprisingly
large use of these—when, where, and for what wars and campaigns issued—
as a way of evidencing what was considered wartime and what not.60 It is
used to stress both the porousness of the beginnings and endings of conflicts,
as well as the observation that if one looks to campaign medals and
decorations, the United States has been engaged across its history in vastly
more years of conflict somewhere, sometime than the public culture recalls.61
This latter point is well-taken, although in that case the notion of concomitant
domestic “emergency,” meriting special measures, is weakened and appears
to be dissociated from conflict as such.
Even so, I doubt I am alone among readers in thinking that the evidence
gleaned from campaign medals is less than fully persuasive as to the
existence and meaning of wartime. Somewhat like the court cases noted
above, and perhaps even more so, the circumstances driving the issuance of
medals and decorations seem far too contingent on other events—politics,
bureaucracy, etc.—to make it into a compelling source of evidence about
even the purely cultural significance of wartime. It seems to me puzzling
rather than persuasive. Still, other readers might find it both compelling as
well as a marvelously indirect method of revealing the cultural subject.
* * *
If reasonable minds can disagree as to the significance of certain of
these materials—the legal cases or campaign medals, for example—there is
at least one matter on which the internal methodology of the book seems to
me distinctly mistaken. The nature of the method involves looking at
frequently specific and very concrete cultural or social practices, in order to

60. Id. at 28–31, 74–76, 137–56.
61. Id. at 28–31.
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interpolate some higher level meaning for society or the culture more
broadly. The text, however, has a tendency to treat matters applicable to
battle as being applicable to war and to use them without discrimination in
establishing the concept of “wartime.”
So, for example, the introduction talks about the common psychological
phenomenon of battle as suspending time itself in the psychological
perception of an individual soldier. 62 Dudziak says that “one meaning of
‘wartime’ is the idea that battle suspends time itself.”63 That is likely true of
battle, as a matter of the psychology and phenomenology of many of its
direct individual participants—but in that case this notion of “wartime,” by
reference to battle, would not seem to have very much to do with “war”
itself. War is more, and bigger, than that. “Battletime,” as we might more
correctly call it, is not “wartime,” and is not obviously revelatory as to the
nature or perception of war, whereas the notion of wartime that drives the
book overall is one that is very much attached to war—war and its cultural
assumptions at the level of the nation and society as a whole.
Whether the condition of war has the effect of suspending time in some
metaphorical way that could be evidenced and debated is a much more
interesting question—and indeed the book does exactly this using a variety of
materials. War might be thought of “suspending” social and cultural “time,”
for example, in the sense of people’s ordinary lives being put “on hold” by
war. Patterns of career, education, marriage and family, and so on, are
placed on hold until wartime is over and people return to their civilian lives,
careers, occupations, and so on. But that is a very different sense of
suspending time than the distinctive psychological phenomenon of time
standing still in the heat of battle.
Moreover, at the large national level, a war that mobilizes all of society,
as WWII did, was not only, or even mostly, about suspending ordinary life so
much as it was about upturning and remixing it thoroughly. Farm boys
moved for the first time beyond their villages, where they saw big cities and
faraway countries. They were introduced to technologies and ways of
thinking and people quite unlike them. Women entered the factories and
wage work; the many changes this wrought over the long run for American
society have been well-studied.
These and so many more were
“suspensions” of time in war as measured by life before—but by war’s end,
in so many of these things and for many people as well, there was no going
home again and no going back. These were permanent changes in the
culture, not suspensions of it—and many in ways that were good for the
country over the long term, bringing about unprecedented geographic and
social movement and mobility. And the permanent nature of many of these

62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
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changes was recognized in WWII; peacetime was going to be peaceable, yes,
but it was not going to be picking up merely where things left off.
The bigger lesson out of this is that although the methodology of
cultural critique often involves examining some small thing by which to
interpolate bigger things, there has to be a commonality between them, and
battle and war lack that. One might wonder something like the same in the
discussion of the famous early Cold War/Korean War case of Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.64 The case is treated in the text for something it
undeniably is—the proposition that there are “limits to presidential power,
even during war,” and the Supreme Court’s rejection of the implication of the
Truman Administration’s argument that there is no limit to the president’s
“inherent power in an emergency.”65
But there is another way of seeing the case that seems perhaps more
pertinent to an analysis of the structure of time and exception. Precisely
because the model of an “emergency” was the monumental emergency of
WWII only a few years before, neither the emerging Cold War, nor even the
Korean War, seemed to the Youngstown Court or, for that matter, to the
American public, to constitute an “emergency.” Not, at least, set against the
standard of Pearl Harbor. The United States was fighting a war, but it was
not remotely like WWII, had not required a congressional declaration even as
a legal predicate (being a mere United Nations police action),66 and no matter
how bloody, protracted, or ugly it finally became (though the Korean War
was obviously a very nasty war), it was war without an “emergency.”
In that case, however, Youngstown itself is less a case about war powers
than about recognizing (or not) an emergency. If Truman really thought the
steel was so important, then he could have gotten it through ordinary, nonemergency-powers means. He wrapped his claimed emergency powers in
the constitutional rubric of war,67 and the Court’s rejection of it68 was not so
much a limitation upon powers in war as disbelief that this “war” was an
emergency which would trigger those powers. In that case, then, Justice
Jackson’s famous concurrence—that the “scope of presidential power varied
depending on whether the president acted in accordance with or against
congressional grants of power”69—should be taken at least partly as a proxy

64. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 88–89.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 86 (noting that the United Nations passed a resolution calling for U.S. troops in
South Korea to forestall a North Korean and Soviet invasion, which grew into the three-year war).
67. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582 (explaining that Truman claimed he was “acting within the
aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces of the United States”); see also DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 89 (describing the
Government’s argument that the President has inherent power in an emergency).
68. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (holding Truman’s seizure order unconstitutional).
69. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 89; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (laying out a three-part framework for presidential powers based in part on Congress’s
approval of the President’s actions).
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for understanding when there was a “true” emergency, or at least as a signal
for greater deference by the courts. I would have thought that the most
interesting reading of Youngstown in the context of “wartime” would have
been to use it to argue that despite what was happening in Korea, and despite
the rhetoric of the 1950s Cold War, it was not really regarded as a “war” in
the cultural sense by a nation that had just gone through WWII, and therefore
did not merit treatment as an exception.
I do not hold out that this is the correct reading of Youngstown or that
this is the analytic point on which to claim the case’s historical importance. I
mean only to suggest, in the context of War Time’s overall argument, that the
distinction between war and emergency is central. Dudziak indirectly
acknowledges this, to be sure, in her observation of how many conflicts the
United States has actually been engaged in throughout its history70—most of
them not part of the American historical imagination, and few of them treated
as “emergency” to the extent they even entered public attention. 71 But
though raised elsewhere in the book, it seems to me an important question to
address as part of the book’s prescriptive conclusion related to today’s war
on terror. Why? The relevance is not only in the general proposition (and at
least partly contra the argument of this book) that wartime does not equal
emergency. It is also to say that this plausibly describes (as Dudziak
acknowledges, but also criticizes, by the book’s ending chapters) 72 the
current situation of the “conflict” once known as the “war on terror.” It
raises a question as to whether an analysis of war and time in assessing
whether we have the right tradeoffs between liberty and security in today’s
war on terror is as important as an analysis of time and “emergency.”
* * *
The book’s analysis of the cultural understanding of time in the Cold
War argues mostly that the perception of the Cold War as a “war” and
therefore as sharply and discretely bounded in the American historical
imagination, had the effect of abetting a massive overreaction against civil
rights and liberties—McCarthyism and all its manifestations. 73 If the
underlying assumption, once again, is that of temporally bounded war, then
alterations of peacetime understandings can be legitimized as temporary
exceptions. Except, Dudziak says, moving from the experience of WWII to
the Cold War, the “war” goes on and on.74 What started as “temporary”

70. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 28–32 (highlighting small-scale United States military
engagements during the twentieth century in China, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Philippines,
Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama).
71. Id. at 32.
72. See id. at 112–13 (acknowledging the distinction between war and emergency). But see id.
at 136 (criticizing our nation’s tendency to divide time into wartime and nonwartime).
73. Id. at 76–85.
74. Id. at 70–71.
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becomes enshrined as permanent—part of a national security state that has
come to be built atop the edifice of the New Deal state.75
This last point makes a perceptive observation about the nature of the
national security state in the Cold War. Many legal scholars, Dudziak says,
studying the impact of war and war making in the Cold War, tend to focus on
how
this era compares with other war eras, not on the development of the
national security state. They measure the domestic consequences,
comparing disputes over rights and presidential power during the
Korean War and/or the Cold War with other wartimes. But traditional
American wartimes don’t offer the right kind of comparison. The
Cold War is not an impact on American democracy that began with an
opening battle and ended with an armistice. Instead it was a period of
state-building akin to the New Deal era. During both periods, the
United States embraced a new logic of governance.76
This is right and important. It was a period of “state-building,” both
domestically and in America’s relationships abroad. It was about the
introduction of new state structures of governance. And Dudziak is shrewd
to observe that the structures created had little or no relationship to a concept
of a temporal end to the Cold War—even as many of the measures invoked
to justify their creation relied tacitly on just such assumptions about the
temporally bounded nature of American war.77
* * *
That point granted, however, the chapter on the Cold War78 seems very
one-sided in its view of the emergency measures accepted as long-term
constraints on what had previously been the peacetime norms. It is
essentially a description of overreaction, and one reason seems to be that it
focuses almost exclusively on the early Cold War and, curiously, focuses less
than one might have thought important on when the Cold War should be
understood to have ended. The Cold War chapter does not really grant to
policy makers, lawmakers, and courts of the 1950s through early 1960s very
much awareness of the need to try and figure out a way to balance liberty and
national security in a long-run struggle—or even, for that matter, an
awareness of the differences between WWII and its temporally bounded
nature as distinct from the Cold War’s much looser, much more porous, and
metaphorical nature as war.
It might be I misunderstand the textual move here. It might be that this
is precisely the place in the argument where the book’s earlier counterreading of WWII comes into play. The chapter on WWII, that is, offers
many reasons to believe that American historical imagination internalized a
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 68–70.
Id. at 91 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. ch. 3.
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sense of war typified by WWII’s sharply marked beginning and ending.79
Most of War Time’s book-long arguments depend upon it, because it says
that this was internalized into American cultural consciousness—down to
today. But the chapter also turns and offers a counter-reading of WWII,
drawn from actual historical facts as well as cultural materials, in which the
boundaries of both beginning and ending are understood as porous, cutting
against it being understood as having a sharply temporally bounded nature.
In that counter-reading of WWII as porous, the Cold War might, like WWII,
be porous as to beginnings and endings—analogous to WWII instead of
standing in contrast to it. The cultural implication is that the architects of the
Cold War, American elites at least, saw the Cold War as being, at least as
regards its temporal conception, similar to WWII rather than different. Each,
in other words, is indistinct in beginning and end, and yet each presents an
obvious emergency for all that. I am unclear, however, as to whether this is
an additional argument in the text in this chapter. If something like this is the
book’s claim, however, it does not seem as if both of those readings could be
right.
In any case, it does not seem to me correct to think even of the early
Cold War and Americans—particularly American elites assembling the
political pieces of the Cold War—as so one-sided and un-self-aware as all
that. On the contrary, it seems to me that there was a broad understanding in
American society and culture that the Cold War did not have the same
specificity as WWII. Part of the difficulty here is that the book focuses on
the early Cold War: the 1950s. But the Cold War went on decades longer
than that—and if one takes it as a whole, it is hard to see that this is an
accurate depiction of its tradeoffs, even in the governance of the national
security state. Indeed, I would have said that America across the decades of
the Cold War did remarkably well, not badly, at trading off its domestic
regime of liberty against security. That is not visible if one sticks with the
1950s.
Moreover, even if confined to the period between, say, 1945 to the early
1960s, there is reason to doubt that the picture is anywhere near as unaware
of the tradeoffs being made as the book appears to suggest. On the contrary,
a different selection of cultural materials for examination would have shown
a deep awareness of the tradeoffs that were being made. Senator McCarthy
was not the only influence.80 Thinking just off the top of my head, I discern

79. Id. at 61–62.
80. After all, the risks of permanent threat to liberty was on the minds of the Founders—most
famously, in Federalist No. 8, in which Alexander Hamilton, reflecting upon external security
threats and standing armies such as those of Europe, warned:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even
the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent
destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort
for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and
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a keen awareness on the part of thinkers and writers in those years of the
ways in which a long war, with no discernible end in sight and no clear sense
of what “victory” might look like, might impact long-run culture for the
worse. The most interesting and important figures in that regard are those
such as George Orwell or Albert Camus—men and women of the antiStalinist, anti-Communist Left who wrestled with exactly such tradeoffs and
anxieties. 1984, after all, is a Stalinist nightmare, but it is set in Britain, not
the Soviet Union. 81 Orwell intended a warning about what our Western
society might become, not a fable about someone else’s society.82 There are
other examples from the period. Science fiction writer Robert Heinlein
kicked off an entire genre of sci-fi horror fables about how our society
becomes their society with his early-1950s minor classic The Puppet
Masters. 83 The “institutional settlement” that defined the American Cold
War from beginning to end—and which distinguished it so deeply from
Western Europe—depended profoundly on the staunchly anti-Communist
convictions of America’s labor union leadership, and yet their concerns about
the organizing rights and liberties of labor, including powers to strike,
assemble, unionize, and so on, were never off the table in the transition from
the New Deal state to the national security state.
For that matter, if permitted a personal point, one of the earliest “adult”
books I read as a child in the mid-1960s was a science-fiction novel, They
Shall Have Stars, by James Blish.84 The premise of the novel is that the
sheer effect of time on a Cold War that, in the story, goes on well into the
twenty-first century, means that gradually “our” side comes to resemble
“their” side, with merely surface differences in form.85 In this, Blish offered
a fictional, mid-Cold War meditation on Spengler’s Decline of the West;86 his
tone was somber, elegiac, and anxious. By the novel’s year 2013, the United
States is democratically governed in name only, and is run instead, behind
the surface democracy, by the hereditary head of the FBI. 87 Deliverance
comes through scientific research sponsored by a brave senator, producing a
faster-than-light drive that allows whole populations of Earth to depart for

political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being
less free.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 61–62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., rev. ed. 2003).
81. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 3 (Penguin 1990) (1949).
82. See MICHAEL SHELDEN, ORWELL: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 433–35 (1991) (indicating that Orwell thought of 1984 as a warning against totalitarianism in general, regardless of time or
place).
83. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE PUPPET MASTERS (1951).
84. JAMES BLISH, THEY SHALL HAVE STARS (1957), reprinted in CITIES IN FLIGHT 1 (1970).
85. Id. at 21 (describing the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as “becoming more and more alike in their
treatment of ‘security’”).
86. Albert I. Berger, Science-Fiction Critiques of the American Space Program, 1945–1958,
5 SCIENCE-FICTION STUD. 99, 106 (1978).
87. Blish, supra note 84, at 5, 12.
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the stars—significantly, escape from both “our” society and “theirs.”88 The
novel contains soliloquies on the ways in which the passage of time itself,
under the peculiar national security pressures of secrecy, brings about
convergence between the societies of the West and the Soviets—or, more
precisely, moral collapse of the Western democracies into Soviet-style
systems, under the implacable demands of the national security state.
* * *
I digress, but not entirely. The point is, deep self-awareness of the
effects of permanent emergency measures in the Cold War were present from
the beginning, and informed cultural understanding, at least at the elite
levels, was present all the way through. The best reading of the cultural
materials reveals deep self-awareness both that the Cold War required
serious political and legal tradeoffs and that “time” itself might have a
dangerously transforming effect on a culture of liberty in a permanent state
of what constituted, if not an emergency, then at least an extended state of
exception. The book partly makes note of this awareness. Eisenhower’s
famous “military-industrial complex” speech, Dudziak observes, sets out the
major concerns about the evolution of democracy into something different.89
I am unclear as to War Time’s argument here, however. It suggests at some
points a framing of the Cold War temporally 90 —but on the mistaken assumption that it can recapitulate the bounded temporal framing of WWII. I
would say, on the contrary, that Cold War thinkers were well aware of the
differences and why the Cold War was temporally not WWII.
But Dudziak’s argument, and its acknowledgment of such materials as
Eisenhower’s farewell speech, could be read to say something quite different.
Although there are cultural materials of diverse kinds showing that
intellectuals, and literary and academic figures were well aware of the
problem of decline into permanently illiberal shifts in culture, society,
politics, and law in the many ways Orwell or Blish describe (and even if this
cultural awareness extended to politicians and even President Eisenhower),
the actual facts of policy, politics, and law show serious overreaction
predicated on the existence of a temporary emergency—an emergency that
would, it was believed as a cultural premise, resolve itself soon enough back
into “normality.” Certainly these were not, Dudziak might say, calibrated
and consciously made tradeoffs between security and liberties, undertaken in
a way that would show society’s self-awareness not of a bounded, temporary
emergency, but instead gradual, un-self-conscious state-building of the
permanent national security state. The permanent national security state was
not created, on this telling; over time, it coalesced.

88. Id. at 11.
89. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 91–92.
90. See id. at 77–80 (noting that the height of anticommunism sentiment and the Cold War were
not precisely contemporaneous).
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Again, I don’t think that is so, not for the Cold War as a whole.
Dudziak’s national state-building observation is persuasive, but I would add
to it genuine self-awareness of the effects of time. That is part of the reason
that it was conceived by many of the participants as state-building; what
Dudziak here calls “state-building,” 91 we might also call “institutional
settlement” for which no end is, but also no end need be, in sight. The
implications of this for today’s war on terror, I should add, probably do not
need to be stated. Likewise the reasons why Dudziak would find the essence
of this “state-building-institutional settlement” a profound political
problem,92 whereas I find it the basis for comfort: we did not build it thinking
it would end, and we knew we were making state-building, institutional
settlement tradeoffs and decisions.
To the extent War Time’s view of the Cold War as tacitly premised on a
temporary condition of wartime is actually true of the 1950s, however, the
historical forces driving this are essentially national security arguments from
necessity, not time. That is true of McCarthy’s urgent appeals to necessity as
a basis for his infamous hearings; it comes close to the famous dictum (which
War Time mentions in the introduction) that in times of war, law is silent;
necessity knows no law other than itself. 93 Eisenhower’s framing of the
dilemma is genuinely a mixed argument from necessity as well from time:
we are “compelled,” he says, to create a “permanent” armaments industry of
vast proportions, necessary to respond to the security threat, but also “new”
in the American experience.94
But War Time is a book in the first place about time and war, not
necessity and war. More precisely, it is a book arguing that oftentimes things
that are asserted to be about necessity and war are actually things tacitly
taken on an assumption about time and war, and specifically an assumption
about the temporary nature of wartime. The arguments writers such as Blish
and Orwell make are arguments from the sheer passage of time, the effects of
permanent emergency measures on the cultural perception of “normal.”
They seem to me frankly closer to the kinds of cultural materials that War
Time ought to want to consider. Moreover, “time” in this sense is more
about culture and society and less about actual policy and politics, and so
literature and the traditional materials of the humanities have much greater
traction in giving insight.
* * *
If that is so, however, then sympathetic as I am to the method of cultural
criticism and its materials, there are limits to what one can get from them. It
is interpretation, not proof; insight, not deduction; apperception, not

91. Id. at 91.
92. See id. at 93 (citing the national security state as “the most important threat to the survival
of what remained of the New Deal in the twenty-first century”).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 91.
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derivation. The selection of anecdotal materials from what is essentially an
unlimited cultural pool involves subjective judgments, and likewise the
interpretation of what one does select. In some things relevant to this topic
one might be able to do quantitative studies of concrete things—the
percentage of military-age males who during the Cold War served in the
military, for example, or the size of Cold War military budgets as a
percentage of GDP. Many things could be counted—and certainly have
been, to great profit in our historical understanding—but matters crucial to
understanding something as qualitative a phenomenon as “wartime” will not
be susceptible of explanation by counting things. This means interpretation
has to remain at a level of “plausibility” at most, and also at a level of
metadescription that seeks to do no more than capture often elusive, merely
glancing, always contestable flashes of “insight” into the culture. It is no less
important or useful for that, however; I honor the method and much of War
Time’s use of it in pursuit of the history of an idea.
When War Time turns to the war on terror today,95 however, it loses
sight of the limits of cultural critique. It seeks to turn plausible but contestable cultural and social insights into action-guiding prescriptions for policy,
politics, and law.96 One understands the impulse. After all, why engage in
all this subtle cultural decoding only to conclude that in today’s world, it has
no actionable implications? The problem, however, is that culture does not
answer policy questions; it is the substratum in which possible policies are
contained. Cultural criticism, however important, does not drive all the way
down to specify very much.
Whereas, by the time War Time reaches its prescriptive conclusions, it
wants very much to tell us to resist the view that the apparent necessities of
war are in fact necessities. That’s no longer an argument about time evidenced by readings of culture; it’s an argument from a policy, and political,
view of what is “necessary” and what is not. Dudziak is very concerned for
us to see that what look to be inevitable features of our strategic security
situation in relation to transnational terrorism are, on the contrary, merely
“argument[s], rather than . . . inevitable feature[s] of our world.”97 This is
the argument from false consciousness again—bringing to bear the revelation
that apparent immutability and necessity driving our policies are actually
constructions of cultural temporality.98 We mistakenly hold a legitimizing
and comforting, but also false, assumption that this antiterror war and its
measures are merely temporary, and so we embrace bad arguments from
95. Id. ch. 4.
96. See id. at 103–06 (connecting Bush-era national security policy with the Administration’s
characterization of the post-9/11 decade as “wartime”); id. at 131–32 (criticizing Congress for
remaining in this “wartime” mindset during the recent debt-ceiling debacle).
97. Id. at 136.
98. See id. (“To take seriously war’s presence as an ongoing feature of American democracy, a
starting point is to cease viewing the nation’s history as divided into time zones, and to look instead
for war’s enduring mark on American politics and American law.”).
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necessity.99 The materials of cultural criticism and the history of this idea of
time in war frees us to see that, faced with these apparently irresistible claims
of necessity, we can indeed resist and need not “suspend our principles.”100
This kind of prescription seems to me, however, exactly what the kinds
of cultural materials that give War Time its genuine analytic interest cannot
do. It can tell us that the passage of time and permanent emergency in a
condition of wartime risks permanently altering our society, politics, and
culture. It might even be able to tell us that in the past, there has been a
tendency to overreach. But this is an argument about the effects of time, and
the actual condition of making tradeoffs between liberty and security is not a
matter of an argument about time but necessity. The materials required to
tell us about that tradeoff are very different from those presented in this book
about temporality. They are exactly what one would expect, in fact:
considerations of politics, policy, and law, in their concrete manifestations
and tradeoffs.
This is one important part of the criticism that has been made of War
Time—criticism in an “external” sense, from outside of the method of
cultural critique that the book employs. It is, for example, an important part
of the criticism that Eric Posner levels against the book in a combative
review in The New Republic:101
Dudziak argues that the decision to classify a security threat as a war
is a political judgment. It is not driven by—or solely driven by—
exogenous events. Since people think that all “wars” are temporally
bounded; people willingly suspend their principles and cede their
liberties, because they believe that the war will come to an end.
Political leaders instinctively understand this cultural feature of
wartime, and take advantage of it. . . .
....
. . . [But it] is not clear why a person would willingly yield civil
liberties (or some of them) on the understanding that the war will end,
but would not do so on the understanding that the war might continue
indefinitely. The only reason to accept limitations on civil liberties is
to ensure an acceptable level of security, and the validity of that
reason does not depend on when one expects the threat to end. . . .
Temporality as such plays no obvious role in this analysis.102
There is something right about this, but also something that fails to give
the method sufficient due. The right part is the shrug of the rational

99. Id. at 136.
100. Id.
101. Eric A. Posner, The Longest Battle, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 6, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www
.tnr.com/book/review/mary-dudziak-war-time#. I borrow Samuel Moyn’s description of Posner’s
review as “combative.” See Moyn, supra note 47 (reviewing Dudziak’s book and responding to
Posner’s critique of it).
102. Posner, supra note 101.
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shoulders to say, look, the tradeoff between security and liberty is one that
exists on account of the threat, how one assesses it, the magnitude and
likelihood of the risks it poses. If it is true today, it might be true tomorrow,
or next year or ten years after; or it might not. A rational person, or democratic polity, will simply have to assess the risks. An exogenous threat has to
be evaluated exogenously. So, as Posner says, temporality, whether a long
time or an indefinite time, or for that matter a short time, plays “no obvious
role in this analysis.”103
Yet while temporality may not play an obvious, or even leading, role in
the consideration of exogenous threats in the tradeoffs between security and
liberty, it is still possible to see it playing less obvious or central roles. Even
within the structure of a rationalist evaluation of the threats stretching out
with less and less certainty with the passage of years, I would have thought
that there would be enough slippage about an uncertain future for which
certain decisions likely have to be taken today, and which have unavoidably
long-run implications, that temporality as such can play at least an indirect
role. The path dependency of security policy, embedded as it is within complex national institutions, budgets, bureaucracies, laws, and regulations, apart
from anything else, ought to be enough to warrant a consideration of the
impact of the passage of time on what security tradeoffs made today might
mean a long time from now.
Consider an uncertain security future, years from now, when there
might still be risks of both our current kind but perhaps other kinds, arguably
calling for new tradeoffs. Yet path-dependent, largely institutional decisions
must be made today that cannot be easily or costlessly altered five years from
now, or ten years from now, even if we might agree that the tradeoffs at that
point in time are not optimal. There is nothing irrational in asking this as a
question about time as such and the pressures it brings to bear. One can
redescribe this, if one likes, not as “time,” but instead as simply the long-run
accumulation of all those institutional, resource, and other pressures over
time—but it does not seem strange to describe that as the passage of time
itself, or to treat time itself as a proxy or marker for all those pressures, given
that their commonality is what happens to them over time. This does not
really seem so different from the picture of institutional investment, the
“stickiness” of investments and opportunity costs, the difficulties of easily
switching institutional gears, and the long-run effects of transaction costs that
run back to Coase and his analysis of institutions in The Nature of the
Firm. 104 That, combined with a healthy dose of public choice theory, 105

103. Id.
104. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in R.H. COASE,
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
105. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 1–6 (2009) (defining public choice theory and explaining the structure of a public
choice theory analysis).
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would explain the role of time—even if as nothing more than a proxy, for
how various interest groups become both invested actors and vested
beneficiaries in the national security state, creating a stable but quite possibly
suboptimal equilibrium in terms of long-run tradeoffs.
It is true that one might—seeing time in this way, as a proxy or
marker—pick a different set of cultural materials to explore than those War
Time picks. But that will always be a possibility; although some of the
materials Dudziak uses do not seem to me revelatory, others do. Where the
concern is about the “exogenous” threat that appears to have no bounded
nature and no easily discernible end, I would have looked, as indicated, far
more to the literature and artistic expression of the Cold War, for example.
This is to say that War Time’s cultural materials about the quite possibly
corrosive effects of time, under conditions of national security emergency,
going on for years and decades, does have a place in the consideration of
policy. It can be seen as a rational intervention in a rational debate in which
time is proxy and marker for accumulated pressures across an uncertain
future—path dependency and all that.
The most important role that materials drawn from culture and society
about time and war have is not, however, as a rational, if indirect,
intervention in the debate over tradeoffs. Coldly rational intervention is not
why the novelists, playwrights, poets, historians, moralists, and moralistes
have so long given voice to the concern about the role of time in war as
reshaping society in permanent and perhaps deforming ways. It’s not even
obviously why Hamilton in the Federalist No. 8 or Eisenhower in his
Farewell Address expressed their concerns about security not merely in terms
of necessity, but in terms of time directly. The concern has always been,
rather, to express all this not as rational argument, but to ensure that a
democratic public and its leadership and elites have before it an awareness of
the effects of permanent war and permanent emergency as affect. And, as
affect, a very peculiar one: anxiety. The literature of the Cold War that I
have mentioned is replete with the cultural affect of anxiety—anxiety for
who we are and what we might, under the pressure of exogenous necessity,
wind up becoming. This is, to be sure, not precisely the cultural material that
Dudziak brings to bear—but I wish she had, because a rich cultural and
social commonality between the Cold War and today’s war on terror is an
abiding anxiety over the reshaping effects of necessity and emergency over
time upon a society and a culture.
* * *
Why should a rational actor care about anxiety? Does anxiety yield
anything here other than anxiety—affect that at most collaterally
accompanies rational calculation or, worse, tends to worsen rational
judgments about tradeoffs? Because, of course, it is true that anxiety over
the passage of time leading to a “state” (in multiple senses) of war and
permanent emergency cannot banish exogenous threats, or the demands of
necessity; real threats cannot be wished away. For that matter, perhaps all
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that a pervasive sense of anxiety adds to this is a perverse form of selfsatisfaction, the narcissism of doing the rational thing, but feeling bad about
it. On multiple grounds, then, it might seem clear that anxiety adds nothing
and might even detract from rational judgments about difficult tradeoffs.
But this is not how the greatest humanists, writers, and historians have
seen as the role of this anxiety. It is hard to read Thucydides on the
Peloponnesian War, for example, without sensing a profound anxiety about
the corrosive effects of so long a war on the very nature of Athenian
governance; it is a moral undercurrent to the whole text and one which
he evidently wishes to communicate. 106 Gibbon on Rome likewise communicates a subtext, expressed not so much as anxiety as regret, a moral
lesson about collateral effects over time of the exogenous and constant
pressures of the barbarian tribes upon Roman governance.107 With writers of
fiction, one can find the same. Brecht’s most famous play, Mother Courage
and Her Children, for example, is set in the Thirty Years’ War, and its
viciously satirical conceit is that the characters in the play are entirely
invested, materially and in every other way, in the war never ending; the
inversion of the play is to express deep anxiety that the war might end, to the
dismay of all. 108 For that matter, this anxiety is even a backdrop in the
children’s fantasy book, Ender’s Game.109
One could go on and on with examples, I suppose, and whether they are
evidence of anything depends in the first place on whether one grants
anything to the method. Perhaps the proper rational reaction is merely to say,
well, anxiety over all that and five bucks will get you coffee at Starbucks.
But I do not think one can dismiss the anxiety expressed by so many writers
over so long a time just like that. The great French poet and World War II
Resistance commander René Char described the war in his poetic notebook
of the war years as “this time of damned algebra.”110 Not merely an algebra
of calculation, a calculus of costs and benefits, but instead both a necessary
rational calculus—and a necessary source of anxiety.
106. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (P.J. Rhodes ed., Martin Hammond trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009). For a useful discussion by a modern classicist, see generally VICTOR DAVIS
HANSON, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER (2005).
107. EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
(David Womersley ed., Penguin Books abr. ed. 2000) (1776).
108. See BERTOLT BRECHT, Mother Courage and Her Children: A Chronicle of the Thirty
Years’ War, in 5 BERTOLT BRECHT: COLLECTED PLAYS (Ralph Manheim & John Willet eds.,
Ralph Manheim trans., Vintage 1972). On the history of the Thirty Years’ War, see GEOFFREY
PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR (2d ed. 1997).
109. See ORSON SCOTT CARD, ENDER’S GAME 255 (1994).
110. The original French is “ce temps d’algèbre damnée.” RENÉ CHAR, FEUILLETS D’HYPNOS
14 (Folio Plus Classique 2007) (1946). Char, we should add, was not merely another literary
“resister,” one of the Parisian writers who occasionally wrote something that disturbed the censors
and then counted themselves heroes of the Resistance after the war, but instead someone who spent
years fighting the German army and the Gestapo in the forests of Provence. See Carrie Jaurès
Noland, The Performance of Solitude: Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and the Resistance Poetry of René
Char, 70 FRENCH REV. 562, 565 (1997) (explaining that Char joined the resistance in 1940).
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Char, too, had concerns about time and war and wartime, and identified
the important moral role of anxiety and affect in tempering apparently
rational judgments about uncertainty and risk into the future. He fought, but
he never thought unimportant to the conception of the struggle, a certain
existential anxiety about what prolonged conflict would do, as well as
prolonged occupation, to undermine, perhaps fatally, une certaine idée de la
France. 111 It is impossible for me to see, frankly, that these kinds of
materials should not have their place, if not in the direct formation of policy
and tradeoffs, then as part of the diffuse and indirect influences upon the
formation of policy that arise from an understanding of time and culture in
war and emergency. But War Time makes itself vulnerable to the criticism
that Posner launches, precisely because it goes beyond this indirect and
diffuse anxiety to believe that these cultural materials and their interpretation
can directly inform policy. The arguments of War Time cannot drive down
so far to policy: in this, the book seriously overreaches.
* * *
I close by noting that this Review has framed the tradeoff as between
the liberties of a nation at peace and the pressures of necessity arising from
exterior threats, which might serve to justify policies and governance that
have little if any basis in the constitutional order of the American republic:
the President will do what he must. Michael Walzer remarked in Just and
Unjust Wars that an aspect of the nature of necessity and the moral crime of
aggression is that external aggression—war—forces people and a society to
do things that they would rather not do, and we can add, this includes the risk
of becoming people they would rather not become. 112 Moreover, Walzer
implies, short of vanquishing the foe quickly and easily, there is not
necessarily anything they can do about it.113 Even the justice of a side’s
cause cannot make resistance to aggression any less necessary or costly;
neither can it make the risk of the transformative pressures of time upon a
free society go away. The possible conditions of response to the aggression
of 9/11 are, over time, more malleable than might have been thought on 9/12,
but they are set even today by conditions of the world, not by a unilateral
imagining that the world is as one would like and not as it is. The tradeoffs
for our principles, which include both liberty and security, are not necessarily
changed on account of being aware of the transformative pressures of time
and permanent emergency.
It is not clear to me that War Time recognizes this bitter truth. If it did, I
do not think it would reach prescriptions about principles that depend upon
necessities of force, threat, and security in the world, and not about time.

111. CHARLES DE GAULLE, MÉMOIRES DE GUERRE 1 (1959).
112. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 53 (1977) (“Aggression is morally as well as physically coercive . . . .”).
113. See id. at 51 (contending that in most cases, fighting, not giving up one’s life, is the
preferred response to aggression).
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What, in that case, do the materials and method of culture, cultural criticism,
and intellectual history have to offer? Anxiety, principally—to the end that
those who think they are making merely a set of rational tradeoffs between
liberty and security be caused to think harder and longer about the full costs
and benefits of their policies. Perhaps this causes an alteration in policy,
perhaps not; perhaps efforts to find ways to ameliorate effects of policies that
one undertakes with regrets, but perhaps not.
Although both the argument of the book and this Review have largely
assumed, so to speak, the nature of necessity, it bears noting that we are not
in that condition today, at least not insofar as it implies an “emergency,” and
not insofar as the leaders of American government today are concerned. On
the contrary, whatever one thinks might have been the state of emergency in
which American government acted in the days following 9/11, it has been a
very, very long time since the justification or public legitimization of the
government’s policies have been on the basis of some necessity alone.
Officials of government have stressed for many years—not just through the
Obama Administration, but back to the Bush Administration—that the
tradeoffs that have been made are indeed ones that are contemplated by the
constitutional order and not just in a state of emergency or exception.114 The
tradeoffs made today are cabined and blessed by the rule of law; there is
nothing ad hoc or nakedly “necessitarian” about them, and there is not even
special reason to think that the authors of, say, the Federalist Papers would
be surprised. That belief might or might not be warranted, of course.
Dudziak would certainly not accept it, and of course, it is merely what any
public official would say, though my conversations with senior government
national security lawyers over several years have convinced me that they
believe it deeply. Yet this might be mere self-deception. It might be true, as
the conclusion to War Time argues, that under the comfort of legal
justification and a cultural construction of the nature of wartime we have, in
fact, merely suspended our principles and impeded “public engagement and
responsibility.”115
This serves to point out that what, as a society, we believe to be true as
to the nature of the threat and the law-governed nature of our response—
including the possibility that it is not actually captured under the rule of
law—is at the heart a debate over institutional settlement for national security
policies. My experience of officials across two very different administrations

114. One can get a sense of the insistence on the rule of law, rather than some rule of
emergency necessity, in the series of speeches delivered by senior officials and particularly general
counsels of leading national security agencies during the Obama Administration. See Kenneth
Anderson, The Canonical National Security Law Speeches of Obama Administration Senior
Officials and General Counsels, LAWFARE (Aug. 28, 2012, 3:37 P.M.), http://www.lawfareblog
.com/2012/08/readings-the-canonical-national-security-law-speeches-of-obama-administrationsenior-officials-and-general-counsels/ (offering a periodically updated list of speeches by senior
officials of the Obama Administration on national security law).
115. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 136.
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tells me that they both worry about precisely these policies and their effects
upon a free society over time, and that they also believe that the principles of
the American constitutional order are sufficiently capacious to allow them to
make these tradeoffs within the strictures of the rule of law. Even if one
accepts, as I do, that they are fundamentally right about this, it still seems to
me that anxiety about these tradeoffs is a virtue—and, for what my
experience of these officials is worth, they think so, too. That is so even if,
as a public official, one believes one has the constitutional discretion to make
these tradeoffs, without invoking any concept of exception or emergency.
Inducing this kind of anxiety has been one of the glories of the
humanities when it comes to writing about war and time from Thucydides
forward. We ought to worry about the effects of endless war upon our
culture and understand that time itself is a source of worry; this is Dudziak’s
contribution through this book. Does this seem like small wages for the
effort of this intellectual framing? Anxiety over time seems to me the
essential value of War Time—there, however, but not further into policy.
Still, no one should underestimate the importance of ensuring that those who,
upon grounds of rationality, make profound tradeoffs between the liberties of
a society and its security, also feel anxiety as to what those tradeoffs today
might mean over time.
Postscript of Inauguration Day, January 21, 2013
Since this Review was first written, Barack Obama has won a second
term in office. In the transition between the first and second term, senior
officials—some leaving government, others remaining or shifting to new
positions—have begun to address directly the meaning and conditions for the
end of the conflict with al Qaeda—as a matter of law and policy, conditions
for it, and consequences thereof. The most important public example is a
speech delivered on November 30, 2012, at Oxford University by the
outgoing DOD General Counsel, Jeh C. Johnson:
But, now that efforts by the U.S. military against al Qaeda are in
their 12th year, we must also ask ourselves: how will this conflict
end? It is an unconventional conflict, against an unconventional
enemy, and will not end in conventional terms.
Conventional conflicts in history tend to have had conventional
endings.
....
....
....
....
....
We cannot and should not expect al Qaeda and its associated forces
to all surrender, all lay down their weapons in an open field, or to sign
a peace treaty with us. They are terrorist organizations. Nor can we
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capture or kill every last terrorist who claims an affiliation with al
Qaeda.
I am aware of studies that suggest that many “terrorist”
organizations eventually denounce terrorism and violence, and seek to
address their grievances through some form of reconciliation or
participation in a political process.
Al Qaeda is not in that category.
Al Qaeda’s radical and absurd goals have included global
domination through a violent Islamic caliphate, terrorizing the United
States and other western nations from retreating from the world stage,
and the destruction of Israel. There is no compromise or political
bargain that can be struck with those who pursue such aims.
In the current conflict with al Qaeda, I can offer no prediction
about when this conflict will end, or whether we are, as Winston
Churchill described it, near the “beginning of the end.”
I do believe that on the present course, there will come a tipping
point—a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives
of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the
group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against
the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization
that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been
effectively destroyed.
At that point, we must be able to say to ourselves that our efforts
should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” against al Qaeda
and its associated forces; rather, a counterterrorism effort against
individuals who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or are parts of
groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda, for which the law enforcement and
intelligence resources of our government are principally responsible,
in cooperation with the international community—with our military
assets available in reserve to address continuing and imminent terrorist
threats.116
This is a statement that lays down conditions of military necessity—
defeat is a necessary condition; there is no compromise or political bargain to
be struck by negotiation; and defeat will be shown, among other things, by
the point at which al Qaeda has been effectively destroyed, its and its
affiliates’ leaders have been killed or captured, and the group cannot attempt
a strategic attack against the United States. These are conditions that define
the “necessity” of a nation’s security and safety—and they do not, by
themselves, express a temporal dimension. Nonetheless, beyond those
elements arising from the nature of necessity, other parts of Johnson’s speech

116. Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, The Conflict Against Al
Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012) (footnotes omitted), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/.
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reveal an acute, even agonized, awareness of time, its passage across twelve
years of war.
“War” must be regarded as a finite, extraordinary and unnatural
state of affairs. War permits one man—if he is a “privileged
belligerent,” consistent with the laws of war—to kill another. War
violates the natural order of things, in which children bury their
parents; in war parents bury their children. In its 12th year, we must
not accept the current conflict, and all that it entails, as the “new
normal.” Peace must be regarded as the norm toward which the
human race continually strives.
. . . [A]nalyzing war in terms of a continuum of armed conflict—
where military force is used at various points without a distinct break
between war and peace—is counterproductive. Such an approach . . .
results in an erosion of “any demarcation between war and peace,” the
very effect of which is to create uncertainty about how to define war
itself.117
This passage from Johnson’s speech captures precisely and eloquently a
crucial moral sensibility that the nature of necessity alone cannot. Without in
any sense denying the stringent conditions that necessity requires for there to
be an end to the conflict, and without offering any prediction when or even if
those conditions will be met, Johnson articulates the collateral cultural and
moral cost of war that risks permanency—the corrosive, illiberal, antidemocratic effects of permanent emergency and permanent war. Johnson’s
speech echoes directly Federalist No. 8; it echoes the cultural and political
literature of the Cold War; it is above all an expression of anxiety by
American political leaders who recognize their responsibilities to address
both the necessities of national security and the troubling effects of
permanent conflict on a democratic society and peacetime culture.
In that regard, it is important to recognize that Dudziak has been both
astute and prescient to observe that the sensibility of time in war matters, and
the more so the longer things go on. Persuaded or not as one might be with
regard to cultural evidence she offers, or for the policy demands she makes
upon the nature of necessity, those who think that the cultural fact of time
passing in war is irrelevant and that only the harsh evaluation of security and
risk matters misapprehend how some of this nation’s most senior leaders
regard the collateral harms of permanent wartime. The harms are as much
moral and cultural as anything, and Johnson offers recognition of this in a
speech that appears to have been cleared in the interagency process as
reflecting the view of the Administration as a whole.
This is not to ignore that this same speech lays down markers of
American security that practically ensure that even when something called
peacetime comes, it will also be accompanied by—Johnson is explicit about

117. Id.

888

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:859

this—continued precise, contained uses of force aimed to ensure that terrorist
groups do not regroup, regather their strength, find safe haven in the weakly
governed places of the world, or gain political control over whole zones and
populations. Peacetime in the sense that Johnson means it will certainly
involve some amount of targeted killing, drone warfare, military and
intelligence assistance to governments battling insurgent groups with
transnational terrorist aims, covert action and discrete uses of force by
special operators and paramilitary forces, and perhaps support to proxy
forces in one place or another. Perhaps it is merely a cynical appropriation to
declare that peacetime has returned and then continue war unabated. Quite
possibly Dudziak, on the strength of her analysis, would say that this is not
actually peacetime, but just an appropriation of words. And, ironically, the
realist of necessitarian logic, and Dudziak’s otherwise combative foil, Eric
Posner, just might agree.
For what it’s worth, however, I think Johnson is right in understanding
genuine peacetime as nonetheless bearing elements of conflict, and right to
reject the claim that this is just the “new normal,” the cynical continuance of
war under a new name. But what he and Dudziak share, any other
disagreements aside, is an appreciation that time has its own effects in war,
and that even if they cannot take pride of place over the exigencies of safety
and security, it is essential that we recognize and seek as best we can to
ameliorate those effects, starting with their recognition as cultural, moral,
diffuse, and long term. The American way of war is at once sense and
sensibility.

